California Western Law Review
Volume 28

Number 1

Article 11

1991

The FDIC's Preemptive Power in Actions Against Insiders of
Insolvent Financial Institutions: A Matter of Priority
Linda D. Fox

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr

Recommended Citation
Fox, Linda D. (1991) "The FDIC's Preemptive Power in Actions Against Insiders of Insolvent Financial
Institutions: A Matter of Priority," California Western Law Review: Vol. 28 : No. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss1/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

COMMENTS
Fox: The FDIC's
Preemptive Power in Actions Against Insiders of Insolv
THE FDIC's PREEMPTIVE POWER IN ACTIONS AGAINST
INSIDERS OF INSOLVENT FNANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:

A MAT=2R OF PRioRrrY
INTRODUCTION

Twenty months after the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),1 the House approved
a compromise bill to provide $78 billion for the second round of the savings
and loan cleanup. 2 "[O]ne of the worst financial mistakes of our century"3
had already cost roughly $167 billion.
Who should pay the final tab for the savings and loan debacle? Is there an
acceptable alternative to sticking the taxpayer with the check? These
questions were partially addressed by Congress when it provided enhanced
criminal and civil enforcement powers in FIRREA.4 However, Congress'
answer created a new dilemma: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
(FDIC) pursuit of restitution and redress from directors, officers, and other
related parties responsible for the insolvency of an insured financial
institution5 brought into question its authority to preempt actions brought by
institution shareholders against the same defendants for the same wrongs.6
Without such preemptive power, the FDIC risks finding pockets already
emptied and unavailable to satisfy any judgments obtained or to replenish the
deposit insurance fund.
Resolution of the priority issue involves fundamental questions of statutory
interpretation and an assessment of the deference due the federal administrative agency responsible for assuring the security of citizens' life savings held
by the nation's banks and savings associations. The financial stakes register
in the billions, and the survival of the federal deposit insurance system is at
risk. Should the FDIC be required to race shareholders to judgment in order
to collect criminal restitution and civil penalties from thrift insiders? Or, is
there a better solution?
This Comment discusses the FDIC's right to priority in actions against
insiders. Part I gives a historical perspective of the deposit insurance
industry, the need for its reform, and FIRREA. Part II discusses the role of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 187 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
Wall St. J.,Mar. 22, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1991, at A3, col. 1 (quoting Rep. Jim Leach (R. Iowa)).
Pub. L. No. 101-73, Titles IX and X.
These parties are generally referred to as "insiders."
See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537 (1 Ith Cir. 1989).
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the FDIC in the savings and loan bailout. Part I addresses the existing law
relating to priority: when the issue arises, what the stakes are, and how the
courts have dealt with it. Part IV analyzes, through statutory interpretation,
whether Congress intended to provide the FDIC with priority in its actions
against insiders. Finally, this Comment concludes that priority is necessarily
implicit in the directives given the FDIC with the enactment of FIRREA.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE INDUSTRY

A. The Birth of FederalDeposit Insurance
The Great Depression is perhaps most closely associated with the stock
market crash of 1929, but it also marked the birth of the thrift industry
structure. This structure carried the nation through multiple financing and
housing cycles for over fifty years. Congress created the FDIC in 1933 for
the "primary purpose of restoring public confidence in banks by establishing
a system of federal deposit insurance." 7 Bank deposit insurance is primarily
funded by the collection of an insurance premium from each commercial
bank.' Upon insolvency and liquidation of a member bank, the FDIC pays
depositors the amount of each account up to the insurance ceiling.'
A year after creating the FDIC, Congress established the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) through the National Housing Act
of 1934. The FSLIC'S purpose was to insure depositors of thrifts and thus
facilitate a "stable, low-cost supply of housing funds."" Thrifts provided
fixed-rate home mortgages for terms of twenty years or more, which were
funded from insured simple passbook savings accounts."
B. Necessity for Reform
Extensive deregulation in the 1980s, "coupled with a severe economic

7. Burgee, PurchaseandAssumption Transactions Underthe FederalDeposit InsuranceAct,
14 FORUM 1146 (1979) [hereinafter P & A Transactions]. The FDIC was originally created by
Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 168 which added section 12B to the Federal Reserve
Act (Act of Dec. 23, 1919, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103.) It is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32.
8. The insurance premium was first set at one-half of one percent of insured bank deposits
but has since been reduced. Tammen, The Savings & Loan Crisis: Which Train DerailedDeregulation or Deposit Insurance?, 6 J. L. & POL. 311, 316 (1990) [hereinafter S&L Crisis].
9. See infra Section II.A. for discussion of the FDIC's possible actions upon a bank's
insolvency. The insurance cap was initially established at $2,500 per depositor. It now stands
at $100,000 and has been broadly interpreted to apply to each account rather than each
depositor. S&L Crisis, supra note 8, at 316.
10. S&L Crisis, supra note 8, at 313.
11. FSLIC insurance started at $5,000 per thrift depositor and stood at $100,000 per account
in 1989. The initial FSLIC premium was levied at one-quarter of one percent on total deposits
and creditor obligations but, as with the FDIC premium, it has been subsequently reduced. S&L
Crisis, supra note 8, at 316.
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downturn
in the Southwest, left the [thrift] industry struggling for survival. " " Between 1980 and 1988, over 500 thrifts failed. This was more than
three and one-half times as many as in the previous forty-six years combined.13 Factors credited with causing such a widespread failure included:
poorly timed deregulation; dismal performance of thrift management;
inadequate oversight, supervision, and regulation by government regulatory
agencies and the Reagan Administration; a regional economic collapse;
radical deregulation by several large states; and outright fraud and insider
abuse." Poor thrift management decisions alone resulted in the failure of
hundreds of FSLIC-insured thrifts and consequently the insolvency of the
15
FSLIC.
By early 1989, when newly-elected President Bush publicly declared the

financial institution problem a national priority, 6 the situation was at crisis
level. 17 The House Banking Committee made the resolution of the savings
and loan debacle its top priority in the 101st Congress and worked toward
restoring public confidence in thrifts in order to "ensure a safe, stable, and
viable system of affordable housing finance." 18
C. FIRREA and the Death of FSLIC

On February 22, 1989, President Bush offered a plan to resolve the FSLIC
problem, introduced in the House as H.R. 1278.19 This plan, FIRREA,
was the "most significant piece of financial institution legislation since the
Great Depression... a solid first step toward a stronger thrift industry and

12. H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 291-92 (1989), reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEVS, LEG. HISTORY, 1989, at 86 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. But
see Black, Current State of the Savings and Loan Industry, 58 ANTITRUST L. J.497 (1989), and
S&L Crisis, supra note 8, that argue the failure of the S&L industry resulted more from the
nature of deposit insurance itself and politicalfaux pas, than from deregulation.
13. Note, Abrogation of ForbearanceAgreements: Unauthorized by FIRREA and Unconstitutional, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 157 n.1 (referencing S. REP. NO. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1989)).
14. LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 90.
15. Id. at 95. Newly established powers were not exercised safely. In many states a more
subtle ethical hazard existed because the federally-backed deposit insurance made any negative
results of deregulation appear inconsequential. Id. at 93. By 1984, more than one-third of all
states had granted their state-chartered thrifts powers beyond those permissible for federallychartered institutions. Id. As long as the federal government was responsible for picking up
the tab for failed thrifts, there was no great incentive for state legislatures to deny sweeping
demands for additional investment powers by the thrift industry. Id. at 90. Seventy percent of
all FSLIC expenditures during 1988 went to pay for problems created by high-risk, illsupervised, state-chartered thrifts in California and Texas. Texas and California thrifts also
absorbed 54% of FSLIC expenditures in 1987. Id.
16. Id. at 101.
17. Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial Institutions: A Crisis?, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222, 224 (1989) [hereinafter InsiderAbuse].
18. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 101-03.
19. Id. at 100.
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a sounder deposit insurance system. " '
The purposes of FIRREA, as outlined in House Conference Report No.
101-222, ranged from promoting "a safe and stable system of affordable
housing finance" and putting the "Federal deposit insurance funds on a sound
financial footing,..." to creating a new corporation to deal with failed thrift
institutions, and expanding civil and criminal enforcement powers of the
The FSLIC was abolished and
financial institutions' federal regulators."
its function as primary insurer of thrifts was assumed by the FDIC.' Title
II of FIRREA established the FDIC's role and amended the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (FDI Act) to cover all insured depository institutions.'

II. THE FDIC's ROLE IN THE S&L BAILOUT
It is necessary to have a clear understanding of what the FDIC must do,
as well as its permissible means of accomplishing the goals of the federal
deposit scheme, to comprehend the significance of whether Congress
intended to grant the FDIC the power to preempt other claims on the assets
of insiders in satisfying judgments.
The FDIC has dual roles when dealing with an insolvent insured institution.
It has power in its corporate role as insurer (FDIC/Corporate) and power in
its role as either conservator or receiver (FDIC/Receiver).u Under section
212(a) of FIRREA, the FDIC must be appointed and must accept appoint-

20. 1989 FDIC ANN. REP. vii.
21. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 432.
22. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 401, 103 Stat. 183, 354 (1989). FIRREA created an "off-budget,
government sponsored entity," the Resolution Funding Corporation, to fund the resolution of the
crisis through issuance of securities, interest on which was to be paid out of "proceeds from
resolving failed thrifts, from Bank Board contributions, and from Treasury appropriation."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 104. The legislation also established the Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC) to "manage and dispose of the assets acquired from failed thrifts."
Id. The regulatory and insurance functions of the thrift industry were separated: regulatory and
chartering functions to newly created Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) under the Dept. of
Treasury; and insurance to the FDIC. This was due to the recognition that many of the
problems of the thrift industry stemmed from "the potential for conflicts of interest which may
arise because of close ties between the [Federal Home Loan] Bank Board and the thrift
industry." Id. at 106.
23. Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 201-226, 103 Stat. 183, 187-277 (1989). FIRREA established
two separate insurance funds, keeping the funds of members of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF)
separate from the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). Id. § 211, 103 Stat. 183, 218-19
(1989). The assessment rates for commercial banks and thrifts differ until scheduled to merge
at a rate of 0.15% in 1998. Reserve ratios are set independently. LEGISlATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 12, at 435.
The FDIC is exclusive manager of the RTC, the mixed-ownership government corporation
responsible for resolving cases involving FSLIC-insured institutions which failed or will fail
between January I,1989, and three years from the enactment of FIRREA. Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 212, 103 Stat. 183, 212 (1989). The FDIC will be directly responsible thereafter. In dealing
with these institutions, the RTC exercises FDIC's conservatorship and receivership powers and
has the same status as the FDIC acting in such capacity. Once the RTC's existence ends on
December 31, 1996, any remaining assets will be assumed by the FSLIC Resolution Fund.
LEGISATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 449-50.
24. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212(a), 103 Stat. 183, 222 (1989).
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ment "whenever a receiver is appointed for the purpose of liquidation or
winding up the affairs of an insured Federal depository institution or District
bank by the appropriate Federal banking agency."' As discussed below,
the right to priority directly affects how the FDIC chooses to deal with an
insolvent thrift, the extent of potential losses to the deposit insurance funds,
and the methods available to recoup those losses.
A. FDICActions and the Use of Deposit Insurance Funds
When a thrift's failure appears likely, the FDIC has several options for
discharging its obligations as both insurer of the deposits and as likely
receiver of the thrift. First, it may make direct assistance payments. The
FDIC will rarely use this method to keep the failing institution running.
Under 12 U.S.C. section 1823(c), the FDIC may only make direct assistance
payments when such continued operation is essential to provide adequate
banking service in the community. 6
If direct assistance is not made, the FDIC may operate the institution, as
its conservator or receiver, with all powers necessary to conduct business and
"preserve and conserve the assets and property of such institution."' The
FDIC's powers as receiver include the authority to (1) place the institution
in liquidation; (2) organize a new Federal savings association to take over the
failing institution; or (3) merge the insured institution with another solvent
institution, transferring assets and liabilities through a purchase and
assumption agreement.'
Placing the institution in liquidation requires
selling off the institution's assets, paying depositors their insured amounts,
and covering any shortfall with insurance funds. Liquidation is the most
costly and therefore least desirable of these alternatives.'
Plus, in a
liquidation, the bank's offices are closed, accounts are frozen, checks are
returned unpaid, and depositors are prevented from receiving deposit
insurance checks until after the reconciliation of accounts. Finally, the going
25. Id.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1989).
27. Pub. L. No. 101-73 § 212(d)(2)(B), 103 Stat. 183, 226 (1989).
28. Pub. L. No. 101-73 § 212(d)(2)(E)-(G), 103 Stat. 183, 226 (1989). See P & A
Transactions, supra note 7, for further discussion of methods of the FDIC dealing with insolvent
thrifts.
29. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1989) provides:
No assistance shall be provided under this subsection in an amount in excess of that
amount which the Corporation determines to be reasonably necessary to save the
cost of liquidating, including paying the insured accounts of, such insured
depository institution, except that such restriction shall not apply in any case in
which the Corporation determines that the continued operation of such insured
depository institution is essential to provide adequate depository services in its
community. In calculating the cost of assistance, the Corporation shall include (i)
the immediate and long-term obligations of the Corporation with respect to such
assistance, including contingent liabilities, and (ii) the Federal tax revenues
foregone by the Government, to the extent reasonably ascertainable.
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concern value of the bank as a viable enterprise is irretrievably lost. The
ripple effect on other banking institutions and the economic community in
general can cause extensive disruption and an erosion of public confidence
in other banks.' °
Many of the significant problems of a direct liquidation can be avoided by
the frequently used "purchase and assumption" transaction.
The chief advantage of the Purchase and Assumption transaction
is that, with FDIC's financial assistance, a sound, insured bank
provides uninterrupted banking services to the community
previously served by the failed bank. FDIC's ability to structure
and to effect Purchase and Assumption transactions quickly and
smoothly provides the greatest protection to our monetary system
and to individual depositors.31
A failing institution will likely have many acceptable assets: cash,
securities, buildings, a network of branch offices, and going concern value.
To optimize these valuable assets, and thus reduce the demands on the
insurance fund, the FDIC will accept bids from solvent financial institutions
to take over the insolvent institution. This allows the institution to be
reopened without interrupting banking operations and with no loss to the
depositors. But, the value of the assets and the premium the purchasing
institution is willing to pay for the going concern value is always less than
the amount of the deposit liabilities which it will be assuming.3
FDIC/Corporate pays to FDIC/Receiver, the difference between the price
paid for purchased assets and the assumed liabilities. FDIC/Receiver, in
turn, transfers FDIC/Corporate's payment to the purchasing bank.3
FDIC/Corporate, in exchange for this payment, receives the assets not
acceptable to the assuming bank through FDIC/Receiver. FDIC/Corporate
then proceeds to liquidate these retained assets. If and when the FDIC "has
been made whole through the liquidation of the failed bank assets for the
cash it expended from its insurance fund for the purchase of assets ...

any

excess recoveries or unliquidated assets are returned for distribution to the
failed bank's remaining creditors,
including subordinated capital note holders,
"
if any, and stockholders. 3

30. P & A Transactions, supra note 7, at 1153.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1155.
33. Id. See also Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (1 Ith Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
826 (1982), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 1059 (1982).
34. P & A Transactions, supra note 7, at 1155.
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B. Replenishing the InsuranceFund
Section 212(d) of FIRREA provides that once the FDIC has determined the
least costly manner of dealing with the insolvent institution and has acted to
protect depositors, FDIC/Receiver succeeds to all the rights of the depository
institution, stockholders, depositors, officers, and directors "with respect to
the assets of the institution."'35 In a purchase and assumption transaction,
FDIC/Corporate succeeds to these rights because it purchased some assets of
the failed institution from FDIC/Receiver with money from the deposit
insurance fund. FDIC/Corporate will then attempt to realize upon the assets
in order to replenish the insurance fund. This may involve the sale of real
estate or securities and other paper, or the pursuit of legal actions that
belonged to the failed institution. Additionally, Title IX of FIRREA
authorizes criminal and civil actions against those contributing to a federally
insured institution's insolvency, amending portions of the FDI Act to increase
penalties and enforcement powers. 36
The changes in the penalties and enforcement powers authorized by
Congress are intended to reverse the historical reality that banking agencies
as a group have not consistently or vigorously used the civil enforcement
actions available to them.37 Before FIRREA, there was a general failure to
pursue directors and officers, emanating from the attitude of FDIC Chairman
Seidman that FDIC's main role was to reform and help the industry. 8
With the abolition of the FSLIC, assumption of its functions by the FDIC,
and the projected inadequacy of the Bank and Savings Association Insurance
Funds in handling the extent of expected financial institution failures, the
FDIC has taken Congress' mandates of enforcement and stabilization of the
deposit insurance industry seriously.39 The emphasis on such actions
increases the FDIC's potential ability to replenish the deposit insurance

35. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212(d)(2)(B), 103 Stat. 183, 226 (1989).
36. Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 901-968, 103 Stat. 183, 446-506 (1989) (amending scattered
portions of 12 U.S.C.).
37. Insider Abuse, supra note 16, at 231 (citing a 1984 subcommittee conclusion that "the
banking agencies often fail to take direct civil enforcement action against individuals engaged
in insider abuse, notwithstanding a clear statutory responsibility to do so" HOUSE COM. ON
GOvERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT AND INSIDER

ABUSE INTHE NATION'S FINANCIALINSTITuONS, H.R. Doc. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
152 (1984)).
38. Insider Abuse, supra note 17, at 233 n.70. Also factoring into the poor record of
pursuing directors and officers was the major difficulty experienced by the FDIC in collecting
assessed civil money penalties. Id. at 233 n.69.
39. Immediately after enactment of FIRREA, the FDIC had ongoing cases and investigations
involving 1250 failed banks and savings associations. 1989 FDIC ANN. REP. 33. In 1989
former officers, directors or borrowers at closed banks and thrifts paid more than $60 million
in restitution payments to FDIC and FSLIC, after being convicted of embezzlement or other
forms of bank fraud. Id. at 39.
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funds.' But the actual success of its actions often depends on whether the
FDIC must fight off other litigants anxious to reach any funds available to
redress their personal wrongs.
III. THE PRIoR=TY ISSUE
A. How Does the PriorityIssue Arise?
At the same time that FDIC is actively pursuing the perpetrators of bank
fraud or misconduct, both under Title IX of FIRREA and as owner of the
failed thrift's causes of action, uninsured depositors and other creditors may
be attempting to collect from these same parties the difference between the
amount received from the FDIC as receiver and the amount they were
owed.41 In addition, shareholders may bring suit in their own right against
directors and officers if they have a personal injury apart from the diminution
in value of their stock.42
For example, court actions were brought in Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporationv. Jenkins43 regarding a state-chartered bank in Florida which
was declared insolvent in February 1986 by the Florida Department of
Banking and Finance. The FDIC was appointed receiver and a purchase and
assumption agreement with Chase Bank of Florida was approved. Shareholders instituted lawsuits against several officers and directors, an accounting
firm, and two law firms, alleging securities fraud, common law fraud, civil
conspiracy, negligence, and civil theft. 4" The FDIC, as sole owner of all
claims, actions, and judgments of the failed bank, brought claims against
substantially the same defendants sued by the shareholders, alleging
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and seeking $30 million in
damages.' The FDIC found itself competing against the shareholders of
the failed institution for the defendants' assets. Based on the common law
rule of "first in judgment, first in right," the FDIC risked losing the ability
to replenish the deposit insurance fund to the extent it had advanced funds in
the purchase and assumption transaction.' If it could not get to judgment
before the shareholders received judgment, it was likely that the assets of the

40. There are up to seven potential claims that can be brought: "(1) fidelity bond, (2)
director and officer or (3) accountants' liability, (4) attorney malpractice, (5) appraiser
malpractice, (6) securities fraud or broker malpractice or (7) criminal referral." RTC OFF.
INVESTIGAnONS PROGRESS REP. 3 (Sept. 30, 1990).
41. Weinstock, Directors and Officers of Failing Banks: Pihfalls and Precautions, 106
BANKING L.J. 434, 435 (1989) [hereinafter D & 0 Pitfalls].
42. Id. at 435, 444.
43. 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
44. Id. at 1538.
45. Id.
46. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text, for discussion of the purchase and
assumption transaction. See also Gaff v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir.
1990), nodfied, 933 F.2d 400 (1991) and Howard v. Haddad, 916 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1990).
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parties responsible for the thrift's failure would be depleted. The FDIC
brought an action for a declaration that "as general creditor of [the failed
bank], the FDIC's claims against the officers, directors, and other defendants
should have priority over the shareholders' claims against the parties." 47
It also sought an injunction to stay recovery on shareholder actions until the
FDIC had satisfied its claims.
In Jenkins, the FDIC claimed that Congress provided the agency with
authority to pursue all means necessary to accomplish its goals." The
FDIC insisted it had priority to the funds of directors and officers to
maximize its recovery and to replenish the insurance fund.49 The shareholders claimed the right to pursue their own actions independent of the
FDIC.'
B. What IsAt Stake?
Establishing a preemptive right to the assets of insiders responsible for the
insolvency of a federally insured financial institution involves a major choice
between conflicting interests. On the one hand, the utility of purchase and
assumption transactions as a means of dealing with the S&L crisis,51 the
reduced cost to the taxpayer of resolving the crisis, the deterrent effect of
enhanced criminal and civil prosecutions, and, potentially, the survival of the
federal deposit insurance system, will all be favored by recognition of FDIC
priority.
On the other hand, the interests of shareholders and investors in the
financial institution industry all oppose FDIC priority. Their means of
recompense for the harms done them by thrift insiders may be eliminated by
the FDIC's depletion of any assets available to redress their losses. The
industry's ability to attract a sufficient number of investors may subsequently

47. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1539.
48. Id. at 1540.
49. Priority in these third party actions has been valued by the Congressional Budget Office
at $95 million for 1993 through 1995. Letter from Congressional Budget Office to Hon. Donald
W. Riegle, Jr. (Oct. 14, 1990) (discussing CBO-prepared cost estimate for budget reconciliation). From August 9, 1989 to September 30, 1990, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
had recovered nearly $14 million from professional liability actions and $13 million in criminal
restitution orders. RTC OFF. INVESTIGATIONS PROGRESS REP. 4 (Sept. 30, 1990).
50. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1539.
51. "The bank insurance fund has steadily declined in recent years, as bank failures have
risen. In 1985, the fund had $1.19 to cover every $100 of deposits. Currently, the fund stands
at 17 cents per $100 of deposits. If the fund runs dry, then taxpayers get the tab for protecting
depositors in failed banks. . . ." Wall St. J., March 22, 1991, at A2,col. 4.
"The S&L cleanup has already plowed through the $50 billion initially requested for failed
thrifts, along with the $53 billion in temporary spending. Overall costs are expected to reach
$200 billion, plus hundreds of billions more in interest costs over several decades." Id. at A16,
col. 1.
As an additional example of the magnitude of the problem, the total cost of the failure, seizure
and liquidation of Charles Keating's Irvine-based Lincoln Savings and Loan, the costliest thrift
collapse to date, is estimated by the RTC at $2.6 billion. Id. at A2, col. 4.
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be affected by the outcome.
C. How Have the Courts Viewed the PriorityIssue?
Given the stakes at risk and the importance of the competing interests, the
ultimate question is whether Congress intended that a federal agency should
have the power to jeopardize the interests of private investors in its attempt
to best represent the taxpayers' interests. The courts are split and follow two
different approaches to the priority issue. These approaches can be seen
from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Jenkins and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Gaff v. Federal Deposit Insurance
52
Corporation.
1. No FDICPriority: FederalDepositInsurance Corporationv. Jenkins.
On November 27, 1989, only three and one-half months after the passage of
FIRREA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
lower court decision which had created a priority for the FDIC over the
claims of shareholders of a failed state-chartered bank in Florida.5' The
lower court had based its decision granting FDIC priority on two public
policy considerations. First, it would be inequitable for general creditors
(i.e., FDIC/Corporate) to have to share equally in recovery with shareholders. Second, the lack of priority for the FDIC would be equivalent to the
FDIC using its insurance fund to finance the investment risk assumed by
shareholders.'
In contrast, the Court of Appeals found the FDIC was not entitled to a
priority over the shareholders by virtue of its status as the insurer of the
failed bank. The court refused to "create a priority which appears nowhere
on the face of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act." 5 The Court of Appeals
relied heavily on its interpretation of the legislative history of FIRREA to
answer FDIC's argument that absolute priority is a necessary element of a
purchase and assumption agreement. First, the court found that "an
amendment granting such priority was specifically rejected by the conference
committee."' Second, the legislative history better supported the argument

52. 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990), modified, 933 F.2d 400 (1991).
53. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1546. Actions brought by shareholders against bank-related
defendants for fraud, conspiracy, and negligence competed with the FDIC's actions for
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against substantially the same bank-related defendants.
Id.
54. Id. (referencing lower court decision, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jenkins, Case No.
86-00566-CIV-T-10, Order at 12-13 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 1988)).
55. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1544.
56. Even though not binding, the Jenkins court found it highly persuasive that the enacted
legislation did not include the Senate amendment which "would have given the FDIC priority
in claims against directors, officers, attorneys, and other third party agents of a failed savings
institution over shareholders, depositors, and creditors." Id. at 1538 n.1 (quoting 135 CONG.
REC. H4985 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Glickman)).
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that "the establishment of an absolute priority would be a disincentive to
private fraud suits and harm the enforcement scheme ...

because it would

lead to more fraud and ultimately cost the taxpayer more money. " ' As to
the FDIC's arguments that it could not carry out its "alleged statutory
mission" without an implied priority rule, the court agreed with the
importance of preserving the insurance fund but not with "judicial expansion
of the express powers and rights granted to the FDIC in the Act by
Congress."55

The Court did not read the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as compelling
"the FDIC to pursue claims to restore the deposit insurance fund against
third-parties who may have harmed a failed bank."" Without such a
directive the court was not "convinced that Congress considered collections
against parties such as the bank-related defendants as a necessary part of the
recovery to the deposit insurance fund. " '°
The Jenkins opinion did not analyze any other provisions of FIRREA nor
its general purposes but was based, instead, on the absence of plain language
directing priority for the FDIC, and the court's interpretation of FIRREA's
legislative history. Although the court recognized the convenience of a
priority rule, absent any case precedent to support the FDIC's claim of
priority, it concluded that "any such priority over third-party lawsuits will
have to come from Congress, not this Court." 6
The Jenkins court was at a slight disadvantage in its statutory interpretation
because its consideration of the lower court decision was done while
FIRREA was still in its pre-enactment and early post-enactment stages. 62
Without a full contextual reading of FIRREA the court failed to give
consideration and weight to the purposes and the legislative intent that might
be implied therefrom.
2. FDICAbsolute Priority: Gaff v. FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation. The Gaff court had the benefit of another year under the revised
structure and directives of FIRREA and possibly a better focus on its
objectives. Fifteen months after FIRREA's enactment, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit came to a decision opposite Jenkins by a
different route: fashioning a federal common law rule. The court in Gaff v.
FederalDepositInsurance Corporationheld that "in actions against officers
and directors of a defunct bank, FDIC should receive a priority over the

57. This argument was presented in an amicus brief by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1540 n.5.
58. Id. at 1541.
59. Id. at 1546. Even though previously citing to FIRREA, the court here appears content
to cite only the FDI Act for governance of the FDIC.
60. Id.

61. Id.
62. Jenkins, however, has recently been relied on by the Fourth Circuit in Howard v.
Haddad, 916 F.2d 167 (1990), reinforcing the need for resolution of the split in authority.
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A stockholder had brought suit in Michigan
claims of stockholders."'
state court against former directors and officers shortly before the bank's
failure. The FDIC settled with the bank's directors' and officers' liability
insurer but the settlement was contingent on the outcome of the FDIC's
action for priority against the stockholder claims."
In upholding FDIC priority, the court reasoned that "the policies behind
the national bank insurance system, bolstered by sections of the FIRRE Act,
lead to the application of federal law and the creation of an appropriate
federal rule of law."' In arriving at a federal common law rule of absolute
priority, the court based its conclusion on both a "general policy of allowing
others to take from the estate of a dissolved corporation before stockholders"
and on "the national policy of protecting the banking system through the
FDIC.""
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit in Jenkins, the Gaff court did not find
the absence of the Senate priority amendment from the final legislation to be
a conclusive rejection of priority by Congress. Instead, the Gaff majority
concluded the best explanation was that Congress intentionally left the law
of priorities in bank receiverships to be developed by the federal courts on
a case-by-case basis.67
The Sixth Circuit also gave little attention to the opposite decision of the
Jenkins court. It briefly distinguished its facts: the source of the cause of
action in Jenkins was statutory, unlike the common law basis in Gaff," and
in Jenkins the bank was state chartered, not federal, perhaps creating
different policy reasons for not applying federal law. The Gaff court
summarily criticized the Jenkins court on its insufficient consideration of the
policies behind the application of federal law to the FDIC.'
63. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 396.
64. Id. at 386.
65. Id. at 391. Even though the court found a congressional intent "to preempt state law by
occupying the field of national bank insurance and the FDIC's rights," it went on to fashion a
federal common law rule. Id.
66. Id. at 396. The Gaff court relied heavily on its reading of specific provisions of FIRREA,
but did what it termed a common law analysis by analogizing to corporate and bankruptcy law.
Id. at 390, 392. Nothing in the Gaff opinion discusses why the court did not base its holding
strictly on its finding of congressional intent, which arguably would be sufficient without
fashioning a common law rule, but it appears that the FIRREA sections cited differ contextually
from the specific issue. Where competing shareholder claims derive from harm to the financial
institution there is less opportunity to question whether the FDIC has succeeded to the right to
prosecute the cause of action as derivative, preempting the shareholder on the basis of ownership
of the claim. But, where the "shareholder's direct action may interfere with the FDIC's
recovery" the causes of action, though stemming from the same insolvency, are separate and
distinct. Id. The grey area delineating derivative and direct actions and Congress' failure to
directly address it in FIRREA, may have motivated the Gaff court's formulation of the bright
line rule.
67. Id. at 396.
68. The stockholders in Jenkins asserted causes of action based on state and federal securities
law. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1538. In contrast, the stockholders in Gaff asserted direct actions
under state law for fraud and mismanagement. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 366.
69. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 366.
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IV. RESOLUTION

OF THE PRIORITY ISSUE

The question of whether the FDIC should have priority over shareholder
claims against thrift insiders is a question of statutory interpretation. As a
federal administrative agency, the FDIC is a statutory creature and analysis
of its powers must start with the interpretation of its enabling statute. An
agency can exercise only such powers as are conferred on it expressly or
impliedly by positive law.'
The FDIC, as illustrated in both Gaffand Jenkins, has interpreted FIRREA
to grant it priority as a necessary means of accomplishing its legislative
Since FIRREA amended and enhanced the powers and
objectives. 7
responsibilities of the FDIC, close attention must be directed to its provisions
to determine whether Congress intended that FDIC would have priority. A
full, step-by-step statutory interpretation involves evaluation of various
resources, both intrinsic and extrinsic to the statute.
One authoritative treatise on statutory construction outlines three basic steps
to interpretation.' First, the evaluation of intrinsic materials considers the
internal structure of the statute, both for express and implied provisions.
Since a statute is passed as a whole, based on one presumed general purpose
and intent, it should be construed as a whole. If Congress has directly and
clearly spoken to the precise question at issue the court "must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."'
Second, extrinsic aids, such as the background of the text, legislative
history, and related statutes are considered. The history of a statute can be
broken down chronologically into pre-enactment, enactment, and postenactment phases. Data may consist of legislative, executive, judicial, and
even non-governmental sources.
Finally, as a unifying concept, all data must be viewed in light of public
policy considerations. The legislature's intent in enacting the statute and
creating the agency is of overriding importance.
Following these rules of statutory interpretation leads to the conclusion that
in enhancing the powers of the FDIC by enacting FIRREA, Congress
intended to extend the FDIC's powers to preempt third-party claims against
the parties responsible for financial institution insolvency.
A. IntrinsicAids to Statutory Interpretation
A search for specific language in the FDI Act and FIRREA yields no
70. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65.01 (4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter
SUTHERLAND].
71. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
72. SUTHERLAND, supra note 69, §§ 45-58.
73. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
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answer to the question of priority. Both the Gaff and Jenkins courts at least
implicitly agreed that the issue is not resolved in plain language. Therefore,
the question is whether priority can be implied from other language in the
statutes. If a statute is silent or ambiguous, the courts must determine
"whether the agency's [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction
of the statute." 7 An examination of FIRREA's purposes and a full
contextual reading of the statute uncovers language and other provisions that
strongly support priority.
1. Express Statutory Purposes. "It is ancient wisdom that statutes should
be interpreted so that the manifested purpose or object can be accomplished." 7" An example of the U.S. Supreme Court's use of purpose
language in statutory interpretation is United States v. Mississippi Valley
Generating Co.76
U.S. v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co. involved a suit for sums
expended in connection with a contract for construction and operation of a
steam power plant. The contract was cancelled by the government because
the power was no longer needed. The Government defended the breach of
contract action based "primarily on the ground that the contract was
unenforceable due to an illegal conflict of interest on the part of Wenzell,"
the Vice President and Director of a major financial institution who advised
and acted on behalf of the Government in negotiating the contract.' Since
it was apparent at the time of Wenzell's employment that the financial
institution was likely to benefit from the eventual contract, Wenzell was
"directly or indirectly" interested in the contract he helped negotiate as an
agent of the Government, "taint[ing] the whole transaction and render[ing]
the contract unenforceable."" The Government was allowed to avoid a
contract under the federal conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. section 434,
even though the contracting party was guilty of no wrongdoing, because the
protection intended as the primary purpose of the statute could "be fully
accorded only if contracts which are tainted by a conflict of interest on the
part of a government agent may be disaffirmed by the Government."79
The finding that Wenzell's actions violated the statute was alone sufficient
to preclude Mississippi Valley Generating Co. from enforcing the contract
since the Court reasoned that the obvious purpose of the statute was "to
insure honesty in the Government's business dealings by preventing federal
agents who have interests adverse to those of the Government from
74. Id. "The courts need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would
have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. n. 11.
75. SUTHERLAND, supra note 70, § 58.06.
76. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
77. Id. at 524.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
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advancing their own interests at the expense of the public welfare. "'
"The statute was directed at an evil . . [ihe seriousness [of which] quite
naturally led Congress to adopt a statute whose breadth would be sufficient
to cope with the evil.""1 Although the statute did "not specifically provide
for the invalidation of contracts which are made in violation of the statutory
prohibition.

. .

that fact is not determinative,

. . .

for a statute frequently

implies that a contract is not to be enforced when it arises out of circumstances that would lead enforcement to offend the essentialpurpose of the
enactment."8
Therefore, the Court recognized that "the inquiry must be whether the
sanction of nonenforcement is consistent with and essential to effectuate the
public policy embodied in [the statute]."' The primary purpose of the
statute to protect the public could be fully achieved only with the sanction of
nonenforcement of the contract, otherwise "the public [would] be forced to
bear the burden of complying with the very sort of contract which the statute
Although it "may seem harsh in a given case,
sought to prevent."'
in order to extend to the public the full
is
required
[nonenforcement]
by enacting [the statute]."'
decreed
protection which Congress
FIRREA's stated purposes give a perspective on what Congress wished to
accomplish and the general tools which it was providing specifically to deal
with its mandates. In particular, the purposes of FIRREA were:
(1) To promote, through regulatory reform, a safe and stable
system of affordable housing finance

.

. (3) To curtail invest-

ments and other activities of savings associations that pose
unacceptable risks to the Federal deposit insurance funds ...

(5)

To put the Federal deposit insurance funds on a sound financial
footing... (9) To strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal
regulators of depository institutions

.

.

(10) To strengthen the

civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise
damaging depository institutions and their depositors.6
Following the logic of Mississippi Valley Generating Co., these directives
alone can be interpreted to require authorizing the FDIC to assume the lead
80. Id. at 548. "In view of the statute's evident purpose and its comprehensive language, [the
Court was] convinced that Congress intended to establish a rigid rule of conduct." Id. at 55051. "Mhe statute was preventive in nature; [laying] down an absolute standard of conduct."
Id. at 559.
81. Id. at 562.
82. Id. at 563 (emphasis added) (citing e.g., Miller v. Ammon, 145 U.S. 421 (1892); Bank
of United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527 (1829)).
83. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 563.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 566. Nonenforcement is required even though the conflict of interest was caused
or condoned by high government officials. Id.
86. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 187 (1989).
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role in prosecuting parties responsible for thrift insolvency, criminally and
civilly. Without such authority, the taxpaying public will be required to bear
the full burden of supporting institutions' failures, a burden normally borne

by investors, and a burden the statute was designed to prevent.'
In contrast, Reps. Staggers and Glickman, members of the House
Conference Committee, presented concerns that priority would go against the
purposes of FIRREA.88 They commented that the failure of the Senate
proposed amendment for absolute priority was based, in part, upon the
recognition that:
[A] priority would represent fundamentally bad policy . .
dramatically undercut enforcement efforts and lead to more fraud.

mhe Judiciary conferees

did not believe that the limited evidence
available supported the proposition that an FDIC priority [would]
benefit the American Taxpayers [but instead] priority would be a
disincentive to private fraud suits and harm the enforcement
scheme....
[Ejnactment of a priority would be at cross purposes with the
savings and loan legislation... [and] discourage, not encourage,
investment.
It is difficult to understand how priority would lead to more fraud. Titles IX
and X were specifically intended to "give a clear signal to those who would
violate federal banking laws that such conduct will not be tolerated."'
Congress recognized the magnitude of the insider abuse problem. It is
doubtful that Congress would have considered shareholders' actions sufficient
on their own to deter that fraud and negligence and yet would have gone on
to enact such an extensive bill as FIRREA. Also, there is authority to
believe that shareholder actions historically were not as pervasive as
supposed:
As a practical matter, the risk of being sued by the FDIC for a
breach of duty is much greater than the risk of such suit being
brought by a private litigant. Private litigants are more likely to
bring suit alleging violations of the securities [law] than to raise
derivative claims for breach of duty. The FDIC has an established procedure for investigating potential claims against directors
and officers of failed banks. A private litigant, on the other hand,

87.
88.
89.
90.

See supra note 51 for the potential impact on the taxpayers.
See supra note 56.
135 CONG. REc. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 107.
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typically is not prepared to undertake the requisite extraordinary
investigation, and must decide whether the expense of discovery
eliminates any personal benefit. In addition, if a basis for suit
exists, would-be litigants would expect the FDIC to bring it.9
The incidence of shareholder actions is likely to increase in the wake of the
crisis-level insider abuse. Even so, bringing the full weight and authority of
the federal government to bear would serve as a much stronger deterrent to
future misconduct than the threat of private shareholder actions. Congress
is unlikely to have intended that the FDIC's ability to put the deposit
insurance funds on sound footing would be even partially dependent on
racing the shareholders to judgment.
The criticism that priority would be a disincentive to private fraud suits and
harmful to the statute's enforcement scheme, is also not dispositive of
Congress's intent for priority. With the enactment of FIRREA, the FDIC
was emphatically directed to pursue all actions against responsible parties.' Additionally, a clear resolution of the priority issue would eliminate
the need to litigate it further, reducing litigation costs and yielding higher net
recoveries.9
The argument that "priority would be at cross purposes with the savings
and loan legislation"' originated with a Securities and Exchange Commission amicus brief to the Court of Appeals in Jenkins. The basis for this
argument is questionable. The SEC argued that industry investment would
be discouraged because investors would not invest in thrifts if they were
prevented from bringing actions against culpable officers and directors; thus
the Commission argued that the goals of Congress for improving confidence
and investment in the industry would be negated.95 In reality, establishing
FDIC priority, coupled with the FDIC's active pursuit of the perpetrators and
reestablishment of a safe, sound, banking system would have more favorable
impact on investment in savings and loans than continued races to the
courthouse. In the long run, public confidence in the system would have a
more significant impact on investment decisions than whether shareholders
could be first in line to sue negligent or culpable directors and officers if the
bank fails.
The stated broad regulatory purposes of FIRREA are restoring public
confidence in savings and loans and ensuring a safe and viable system of

91. D & 0 Pitfalls, supra note 41, at 445. Although nothing in the record indicates Congress
knew of the lack of significant shareholder actions, it is clear from the record that Congress
knew of the need to increase regulatory enforcement powers to accomplish the goals.
92. See notes 34-37 supra, and accompanying text.
93. In 1987, the FDIC recovered $59 million in lawsuits against costs of $54 million to
litigate the cases. 135 CONG. REC. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
94. Id.
95. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Jenkins, 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-3798).
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affordable housing finance. These purposes can best be achieved by
elimination of the challenges to the FDIC's efforts at obtaining monetary
judgments from fraudulent and negligent institution-related parties in order
to replenish the insurance fund. Replenishing the insurance fund will
subsequently reduce the degree to which the taxpayer will be required to bear
the burden of funding the losses resulting from the S&L debacle.
2. Other Provisionsin the Statute. Although there is no specific language
in FIRREA directly addressing the priority issue, there are sections which,
when read in conjunction with its stated purposes, help support the finding
of implied priority for the FDIC. First, section 212(a) vests in the FDIC
"all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository institution,
and of any stockholder... with respect to the institution and the assets of
the institution."9 This section delineates the basic authorities of the FDIC
in its conservatorship and receivership powers and names the Corporation as
successor to the institution. 97 Where shareholders are bringing derivative
actions, actions that could be brought directly by the institution, this
provision would automatically place FDIC in a position superior to
shareholders. But, where shareholder action is against directors and officers
with respect to individual private rights, not "with respect to the institution
and assets of the institution," the provision might not automatically control.
The question is whether an as-yet unexercised right to sue abusive insiders
is considered an "asset of the institution" that is transferred to
FDIC/Receiver, or whether it is an action of the FDIC as insurer. There is
no express answer in this section.
Second, the same section of FIRREA contains a provision for distribution
of assets from any liquidation. This provision directs that amounts from
subrogated claims should be paid to depositors and other creditors, net of
amounts to which FDIC/Corporate may be entitled. Only after -'all
depositors, creditors, other claimants, and administrative expenses are
paid"' is the receiver to distribute remaining funds to shareholders or
members. The intent is clear: FIRREA placed shareholders in the position
of last recovery, consistent with FDIC priority in civil actions against
insiders.
Third, FIRREA added a new section concerning the FDIC's right of
subrogation to the rights of depositors. 9 The Gaff court found this a
demonstration of "Congress's intent to preempt state law by occupying the
field of national bank insurance and the FDIC's rights."" ° Since the
96. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212(a), 103 Stat. 187, 225-26 (1989) (amending 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added)).
97. Id.
98. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212(a), 103 Stat. 187, 231 (1989) (amending 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(n)(B)).
99. Id. § 212(a), 103 Stat. 187, 241 (1989) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821(g)).
100. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 391.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss1/11

18

1991]

Fox: The
FDIC's Preemptive
in Actions
Against Insiders of Insolv
FDIC's
PRIORITY
IN ACTIONSPower
AGAINST
INSIDERS

depositors have priority over the shareholders" 1 and the FDIC has stepped
into the shoes of the depositors, the FDIC should have priority over
shareholders. It is unclear, however, where the FDIC is "subrogated to all
rights of depositors against the institution," whether actions against insiders
are within these rights. The spirit of the statute implies that when damages
are caused by insiders, FDIC priority is due.
Finally, section 1208 provides:
Funds appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to
an authorization contained in this Act, and any amount authorized
to be borrowed from the Secretary of the Treasury by any entity
pursuant to this Act, may only be used as permitted by law, and
may not otherwise be used for making any payment to any
shareholder in, or creditor to, any insured depository institution.y02
This provision shows congressional intent to put not only depositors' but also
the taxpayers' interests ahead of shareholders whenever the taxpayer is called
upon, through fundings appropriated to the Secretary of the Treasury, to pay
the losses of defunct institutions. Based on the inadequacy of the Savings
Association Insurance Fund, and projections that losses will run over $200
billion, the shareholders must take a junior position to the FDIC's attempts
to replenish the insurance fund. It may be argued that this section could just
as easily strengthen the idea that, since shareholders were not entitled to
direct tax dollars, Congress would want to preserve lawsuits as a source for
their recompense. It is more likely, however, intended to assure that
shareholders would not be insured by the deposit insurance fund, which was
established for the sole protection of depositors. Congress' first duty is to
the taxpayer, the most innocent party in the S&L debacle. Denying priority
to the FDIC would be in direct conflict with section 1208 and with the
intended preferred position of the FDIC implicit in the other FIRREA
sections.
B. Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation
Courts also look to sources outside the text of the statute for indications of
legislative intent in statutory enactment. There are three types of extrinsic
sources relevant to interpreting intent. These are: (1) circumstances and
events surrounding the introduction of the legislation (pre-enactment
legislative history); (2) the history of the enactment process itself, including
101. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 212(a), 103 Stat. 187, 231 (1989).
102. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1208, 103 Stat. 187, 523 (1989) (emphasis added). Direction to
§ 1208 for support of priority was provided by Ira Paull, Republican Counsel for Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs during a telephone conversation (Feb. 13,
1991).
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other statutes that may be useful in recognizing policy choices made in
aids such as judicial common law and
similar contexts; and (3) contextual
13
implementation.
administrative
1. Pre-enactment Legislative History. The circumstances leading to
enactment of both the FDI Act and FIRREA involved extreme economic
crises. The FDI Act was created as a result of the Great Depression.
The mischief at which
FIRREA was a response to the S&L crisis."
FIRREA was aimed is clear from its stated purposes and from the enhancement of regulatory powers against criminal and civil misconduct of institution
insiders in Titles IX and X. These circumstances and Congress' response
support the FDIC's interpretation of its priority in the third-party actions.
2. Enactment ProcessHistory. The strongest argument against the FDIC's
priority was recounted by the Court of Appeals in Jenkins and falls under the
rubric of legislative history. An amendment clearly establishing the FDIC's
priority was proposed initially in subcommittee, added to the Senate version
of FIRREA that went into the Conference Committee, but did not survive
markup of the bill.1 5 Despite the lack of publicly available reports to
explain the amendment's failure,"r the Jenkins court saw the rejection of
the amendment as significant in the legislative history of FIRREA. The
statements of Reps. Glickman and Staggers1" found in the Report of the
Conference Committee on H.R. 1278 were footnoted in Jenkins as persuasive
Treatises on statutory construction agree that committee
authority.'
reports should be considered authoritative legislative history and given great
weight.' ° But, it is not clear from the Congressional Record whether these

103.

See SUTHERLAND supra note 70, § 48.01, and W.N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & P. FRICKEY,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
(1988) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION].

104. See supra notes 6-8 and 11-22 and accompanying text.
105. The text of the proposed amendment was:
In any proceeding related to any claim acquired under section 11 or 13 of this Act
against an insured financial institution's director, officer, employee, agent,
attorney, accountant, appraiser, or any other party employed by or providing
services to any insured financial institution, any suit, claim, or cause of action
brought by the Corporation shall have priority over any such suit, claim, or cause
of action asserted by depositors, creditors, or shareholders of the insured financial
institution. . . . This priority shall apply to both the prosecution of any suit,
claim, or cause of action, and to the execution of any subsequent judgments
resulting from such suit.
Gaff, 919 F.2d at 395 (citing S. 774, 101st Cong., 1st Session § 214(o)(1) (1989)).
106. Telephone interview with Ira Paull, Republican Counsel, Committee on Banking, Housing
& Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Feb. 13, 1991).
107. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
108. Jenkins, 888 F.2d at 1538 n.I.
109. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 103, at 709.
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statements were read aloud during the meeting of the House or just entered
into the record. Therefore, they may not be indicative of any consensus as
to the reasoning for non-inclusion of the amendment. Moreover, courts are
now relying less on the statements of individuals due to "the trend to distort
legislative history via planned colloquies."110
The Sixth Circuit in Gaff did not find the failure of the amendment
dispositive against priority but did not address any of the specific justifications mentioned by Reps. Glickman and Staggers. Evaluation of these
objections here and above supports the Gaff court's result. Besides the three
reasons related to the purposes of FIRREA, as discussed above,"' the
failure of the amendment was also credited to the lack of "careful study of
the priority proposal by Congress" and the manifest unfairness of the
proposal "on its face .... No other Federal agency has been granted such

broad power to prejudice the rights of individuals."'
The lack of careful study of the priority proposal may be dispositive of
why the specific amendment did not get included in the final bill, but not
dispositive of Congress' intent to vest the FDIC with priority when it passed
FIRREA. The stated objectives and the implied powers necessary to
accomplish those objectives could have been considered sufficient and any
additional language unnecessary.1 3 Finally, the rejection of the language
of the priority amendment may also be explained two other ways. Congress
may have intentionally refused to do what "those with great expertise and
charged with the responsibility for administering the provision would be in
a better position to do .

. . ."

Or "perhaps Congress was unable to forge

a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to
take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency." 1 4
The charge of unfairness and the representation that "no other Federal
agency has been granted such broad power to prejudice the rights of
individuals"" 5 can be answered by examining corporation law and bankruptcy law, as the Court of Appeals did in Gaff.
The Gaff court recognized the basic premise that in the dissolution of a
corporation, stockholders are last in line for the corporate assets. 1 6 Unlike
lenders and depositors who do not have the chance of reaping profits if the
corporation does well, the risk of a shareholder's investment is offset by

110. Id. at 735.
111. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
112. 135 CONG. REC. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
113. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
114. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
115. 135 CONG. REC. H4989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989).
116. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
89 (1989).
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potential for reward. 117 Allowing first or equal basis recovery to shareholders against the assets of directors and officers would result in an
"inequitable preference in favor of the stockholders.""'8
The Gaff court also analogized to the bankruptcy doctrine of equitable
subordination, reasoning that the degree of priority given to a direct action
by creditors or stockholders over action by a trustee in bankruptcy turned on
whether the injury was greater to the individual creditor, stockholder, or
corporation. 1 9 The corporation is given priority unless the injuries can be
shown to be unique or peculiar to the shareholders or creditors. The
doctrine does not disallow shareholders' and creditors' claims, but subordinates them, allowing a court of equity to look at overall fairness of
competing claims, subordinating those determined to be less fair."2 The
court also noted the treatment of rescission claims in the Bankruptcy Code.
The 1978 Code put investors who sued for rescission on equal standing with
all investors. Previously rescission-seeking investors had been allowed
recovery at the same level of preference as judgment creditors.'
The Gaff
court saw this as Congress' allocation of the "risk of business failure to
stockholders and away from debt investors . . . to close a loophole that

permitted stockholders to move up in line."'"
As relied on by Gaff, analogy to corporate and bankruptcy law support
priority. Both establish precedent for allowing first in right to be determined
other than by first to judgment. But, as argued by Rep. Glickman, although
Congress may be willing to trade off shareholders' rights vis-a-vis other
private entities, it has not yet been willing to allow a federal agency to have
priority. This quarrel with FDIC priority may be answered by noting the
semi-private role the FDIC assumes in its capacity as receiver. The FDIC
is "the designated statutory agent for marshalling and distributing the assets
of the insolvent bank,"" and, as such, is acting more as a private entity
than a government agency. Therefore, the agency versus private party
distinction can be considered less important.
3. Agency Deference-Post-enactmentPhase. Evidence of later congres117. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 392. "The gains and losses from abnormally good or bad performance
are the lot of the shareholders, whose claims stand last in line [because] shareholders are the
residual claimants to the firm's income... [they have the] appropriate incentives... to make
discretionary decisions." Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395, 402-04 (1983).
118. Id. "Allowing shareholders to get their money first allows them to step over the
depositors on the way up the totem pole. This is unfair." 137 CONG. REC. S1309 (daily ed.
Jan. 30, 1991) (comments of Sen. John Heinz upon introduction of S. 293, a bill to reduce the
cost of the savings and loan crisis and his third attempt to correct the confusion on priority by
enactment of a specific provision) (emphasis added).
119. Gaff, 919 F.2d at 393.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 394 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 510(b)).
122. Id. at 394.
123. Id. at 392.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss1/11

22

1991]

FDIC's PRIoRITY IN ACTIONS AGAINST INSIDERS
Fox: The FDIC's Preemptive Power in Actions Against Insiders of Insolv

sional intent does not generally bear on the intent behind earlier congressional enactment, but "[i]nterpretations and application of regulations by
officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads and others officially
charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute have great
weight in determining the operation of a statute." 1" The Supreme Court
explained the deference due an administrative agency's statutory interpretation in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. :12

Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather that explicit. In such a case, a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference
to administrative interpretations
"has been consistently followed by this Court whenever
decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has
involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations.
If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative
history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned." 12
Analogizing to the FDIC's interpretation on the priority issue, the two
conflicting policies left to the agency's care are protecting the taxpayer
through the insurance fund by collecting losses from responsible third parties,
and allowing shareholder actions against corporate insiders responsible for
damage done them. Stated another way, the competing interests are

124. SUTHERAND, supra note 70, § 49.05.
125. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
126. Id. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)) (citation
omitted).
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taxpayers versus private investors. It is not a stretch to say that these are
both within the province of the FDIC. Since shareholders are also regulated
parties as owners of the insured thrifts, the shareholders should be governed
first by the regulators of the insurance fund and then given recovery rights
under the SEC rules.
The FDIC's position on priority is fully consistent with the policy
concerns, as identified by the legislative history, that motivated the enactment
of FIRREA. In both Jenkins and Gaff the FDIC maintained it had right to
priority.127 Although this may appear self-serving, as insurer the FDIC has
the duty to protect the taxpayer as well as the depositors in its management
of the deposit insurance funds. Based on the supportive provisions of
FIRREA, and its clear purposes and objectives, it would be illogical and
inconsistent for the FDIC to support a contrary position. To the extent
congressional intent is discernible, FIRREA was most likely intended to
enlarge rather than confine the scope of the FDIC's power.
C. Public Policy as a Source of Statutory Interpretation
In the legislative history accompanying FIRREA, the Conference
Committee recognized that restoring "the strength of the thrift industry and
deposit insurance fund would require more than legislation," it would also
require the vigilance and responsiveness of regulators. 12 A strong banking
system, worthy of confidence in the safety of its deposits and providing a
source of funding for home ownership, is best served by adhering to the
implied power inherent in FIRREA.
First, as the Gaff court indicated, a race to the courthouse should not be the
means of determining such an important and basic issue.1" Where the
alternative is to allow the innocent taxpayer to bear the cost of the S&L
debacle so that shareholders might recover their investments, the decision
must be for the innocent taxpayer. Shareholders are held to know the risks
of investing and can spread those risks by diversifying. It would be
inequitable to allow shareholders unearned preference over taxpayers.
Second, under general theories of deterrence, efforts must be made to
pursue the perpetrators in the savings and loan debacle. FIRREA Titles III,
IX, and X all contain provisions aimed at deterring the ongoing abuse of the
financial institutions." 3 Congress enhanced "the regulatory enforcement
powers of the depository institution regulatory agencies to protect against
fraud, waste and insider abuse."13 Only by actively pursuing such claims

127.
Court
128.
129.
130.

In effect, the Jenkins court gave no deference to the agency, contrary to the U.S. Supreme
holding in Chevron.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 87.
Gaff, 919 F.2d at 394.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
131. LEGISATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 103-104.
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with the strength and resources of government can the rampant abuse be
stopped."r The public policies of minimizing the taxpayer's burden for the
savings and loan debacle, and deterring any further insider abuses of
financial institutions are both met by recognizing the FDIC's priority over
third party actions.
Congressional intent is apparent by combining the implied intent from
specific statutory provisions of FIRREA and its broad regulatory purposes
and by legitimately deferring to the administrative agency's interpretation.
Add to that the broad public policy considerations of deterrence, recovery,
and restoration of confidence in the financial industry, and priority belongs
to the FDIC.
CONCLUSION

Congress gave the FDIC strong directives with the enactment of FIRREA.
The savings and loan crisis had grown out of hand and required major
revision of the entire deposit insurance industry. The FDIC had been given
a large portion of the responsibility for stopping the cancer of abuse in the
nation's savings and loans. To accomplish this goal, Congress provided the
FDIC authority to enforce enhanced corrective and deterrent measures. This
authority must extend to the FDIC's ability to effectively pursue restitution
and damages from the parties responsible for the insolvency of the failed
institutions. Without priority over the claims of third parties, the FDIC will
be reduced to racing to judgment, an unacceptable and costly requirement.
The federal deposit insurance industry is seriously ailing and further
changes can be expected before its survival is assured. The reestablishment
of a strong, safe, national banking industry will be closer to achievement by
enforcing the legislative intent to provide the FDIC with all the necessary
powers to accomplish its purposes.
Linda D. Fox*

132. The Jenkins court was concerned about the slow pace of government actions and the risk
of running of the statute prior to shareholders getting their day in court. The proposed priority
bill offered by Senator Heinz on January 30, 1991, includes time and notice restrictions which
would effectively answer these concerns. 137 CONG. REC. at S1309-10 (daily ed. Jan. 30,
1991).
* This Comment is dedicated with love and appreciation to Stephen Fox for his support and
encouragement. The author also wishes to thank Professor Glenn C. Smith for his invaluable
guidance.
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